In 2010, Congress authorized the agency to set standards for ensuring that interchange transaction fees (payments that merchants pay to banks to process debit card transactions) are “reasonable and proportional to the cost incurred by the issuer with respect to the transaction,” in accordance with the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act. The agency complied by passing Regulation II, restricting maximum interchange fees to $0.21 per transaction plus 0.05% of the transaction’s value. The store owner sued the agency, claiming that Regulation II allowed for higher interchange fees than the Dodd-Frank Act allows. The district court dismissed the store owner’s claim, holding that the 6-year statute of limitations to bring a facial challenge to a final agency action begins when the agency publishes the regulation. Because the agency published Regulation II in 2011 and the store owner filed suit in 2021, the court held that the store owner filed suit after the statute of limitations. The appellate court upheld the district court’s decision.
In Corner Post, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., 144 S. Ct. 2440 (2024), the Supreme Court reversed the trial and appellate court’s dismissal of the store owner’s claim and remanded the case. The Court based its ruling on 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 704, and 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a). 5 U.S.C. § 702 provides that “[a] person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action … is entitled to judicial review thereof.” 5 U.S.C. § 704 states that only final agency actions are subject to review. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) establishes a statute of limitations for challenging final agency actions of “six years after the right of action first accrues.” The agency had argued that an action “accrues” when an agency action is final, not when a party is injured. The Court held otherwise. The meaning of “accrue” has long meant “when the plaintiff has a complete cause of action.” This was the word’s meaning when Congress passed 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) in 1948 and remains true today. Around the same time Congress passed 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a), Congress passed laws establishing statutes of limitations which expressly begin upon the issuance of agency orders, demonstrating that when Congress intended a statute of limitations to begin to run upon agency action, Congress would specify this in its wording. Additionally, the use of the word “the” in the statute further supports the plaintiff-specific accrual date: by using “the” cause of action rather than “a” cause of action, Congress indicated that the statute of limitations begins to run following the beginning of a particular plaintiff’s cause of action, rather than any cause of action.
By Gregory Ferrer, [email protected]
Edited By Ashley Boyce, [email protected]
Edited By Hayden Mariott, [email protected]