Congress passed 16 U.S.C. § 1801 et seq. (the act) to regulate overfishing in international waters near U.S. coastlines. The act provided for councils that created “fishery management plans, which [the agency] approves and promulgates as final regulations.” The plans contained numerous rules, including regulations on annual catch limits, fishing gear, allocating catches to research, and other rules as “necessary and appropriate for the conservation and management of the fishery.” At issue here were plans that required certain qualified fishing vessels to carry and pay for “observers.” The agency amended the act to require vessels to notify the agency of a planned expedition, and the agency would determine whether an observer was required and whether the vessel owner would be responsible for the fee. The costs, far from nominal, could be as much as “$710 per day, reducing annual returns to the vessel owner by up to 20 percent.” In two separate cases, several businesses (collectively “the businesses”) challenged the amended rule, arguing that the act does not give the agency the authority to require payment of observers. Both district courts granted summary judgment against the businesses and deferred to the agency’s interpretation of the act, citing the Supreme Court’s opinion in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Chevron established a “two-step framework to interpret statutes administered by federal agencies.” The first step is determining “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.” Id. at 842. “Clear” intent from Congress is final, but silence or ambiguity requires deference to an agency's “permissible construction of the statute.” Id. at 843. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and combined the cases to determine “whether Chevron should be overruled or clarified.”
In Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 144 S.Ct. 2244 (2024), the Supreme Court of the United States overruled Chevron. First, the Court discussed the judiciary’s Article III power, ability to make independent judgments, and its “province and duty… to say what the law is.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). The Court held that while they may give “respect” to agency interpretation, it could never bind a court or “judicial judgment would not be independent at all.” Second, the Court analyzed its history of deference to agency determinations and found that during the New Deal era, courts had deferred to “factbound determinations” but not to legal questions. In addition, Congress had passed the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which gave the courts the authority to interpret “‘all relevant questions of law’ arising on review of agency action.” 5 U.S.C. §706. The Court found it notable that the act did not proscribe any standard for deference to an agency and stated that the text, history, and plain meaning of the APA show that courts are not required to show deference to agencies. Although Congress may enact a statute delegating power or authority to an agency, the court still has the responsibility to “independently interpret the statute and effectuate the will of Congress subject to constitutional limits.” The Court took issue with Chevron and its progeny for its failure to “reconcile its framework with the APA”; in its view, the two cannot coexist. Next, the Court addressed the dissent and noted that an ambiguity in a statute does not mandate deference to an agency, nor does Congress’ inaction in resolving the ambiguity demonstrate intent for deference to an agency. The Court stressed that courts must find the “best” meaning of the statute and that while courts have experience dealing with ambiguity, “agencies have no special competence in resolving statutory ambiguities.” The respondents argue that the agencies have expertise in certain areas, and due to the potential for policymaking in interpreting the statutes, the determination is “best left to political actors, rather than courts.” Finding both arguments unpersuasive, the Court held that deference is unnecessary because courts routinely resolve disputes requiring technical expertise and have the duty to “interpret statutes, no matter the context.” In fact, the Court opined, “Chevron does not prevent judges from making policy. It prevents them from judging.” Finally, the Court addressed stare decisis and held that it was not bound to the precedent set by Chevron because it has “proved to be fundamentally misguided… unworkable… [and] [r]ather than safeguarding reliance interests, Chevron affirmatively destroys them.” However, the Court clarified that this decision does not disturb the outcomes of Chevron or its progeny. Ultimately, the Court overruled Chevron and affirmed the duty of the courts, under the APA, to make independent judgments without deferring to an agency's interpretation of a statute.
By Hayden Mariott, [email protected]
Edited By Ashley Boyce, [email protected]